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MERGER BY JUDGMENT

By MAYNARD E. PrsIG*

LEGAL concepts are necessary and useful tools for the development of the law. But their relation to the actualities of the
problems with which they deal must be constantly kept in mind.
When decisions, in the instances is which a concept is ostensibly
used, are reached for reasons independent of it and unrelated to its
content, and in other instances are rendered in open disregard of
it, serious consideration should be given to whether the concept
itself ought not to be discarded.
These comments apply with peculiar force to the doctrine
known as merger by judgment. It is the belief of the present writer,
developed'in the pages -which follow, that the doctrine serves no
useful purpose and cannot be relied upon as a guiding principle of
law; that every problem for the solution of which it is invoked
can be, and in fact usually is, resolved by the courts without its
help, that it has caused considerable uncertainty and confusion in
various fields of law; and that it is merely the survival of false
analogies and artificial generalizations indulged in during the early
common law period.
The principal consequences following upon the rendition of a
judgment are well known. Under the familiar principles of res
judicata, if judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, he will not be
allowed to sue the defendant again on the same cause of action. A
similar result follows if judgment is rendered for the defendant.
The plaintiff cannot maintain another action against the defendant
on the- same cause of action. In either case, it is unfair to defendant
and an unnecessary burden on the courts to permit the second
action. The plaintiff has hiad his day in court. It is not unfair to
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
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expect him to abide the result. So far as concerns the judgment
for the defendant, this ends the matter. It is not ended when
judgment goes for the plaintiff. In that case it is said that the
plaintiff's cause of action has become merged into the judgment
and extinguished by it and that it is for this reason that he cannot
bring the second action. This is an application of the doctrine of
merger by judgment. The denial of the second action is one instance in which the doctrine is used as an explanation. But there
are also other consequences said to follow which will be considered
in the course of this discussion.
Probably the most complete and sympathetic, but not always
consistent, acceptance of the doctrine appears in the Restatements
of several subjects of the American Law Institute. Its first appearance is in the Restatement- of Contracts and is in the following
form

"A contractual duty or a duty to make compensation is
discharged by merger when a judgment to enforce that
duty is rendered against the party subject to the duty, and
in favor of the party having the correlative right, by any
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the
parties."'
This Restatement evidently considers the concept of merger
as having broader application than merely to judgments for there
are sections also "on merger by award, 2 merger by sealed instruments, • merger by informal writing 4 and merger by negotiable
instruments.5 There is also a general definition of merger to the
effect that it consists of the substitution of a new duty for an
earlier one." Merger also appears to be considered as involving
principles distinct from those of res judicata for the following
section under the heading "Discharge by Adjudication" provides
"A contractual duty or a duty to make compensation
is discharged by adjudication where a judgment of any
court, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and of
the parties, is rendered in a litigation between the party
owing the duty and the party entitled to its performance
'Restatement
of Contracts, sec. 444.
2
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 445.
3
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 446.
4Restatement of Contracts, sec. 447
5
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 448.
6
"A contractual duty or a duty to make compensation is discharged by
merger, when the duty is replaced by a duty between the same parties, based
on different operative facts, for the same performance or for a performance
differing only in liquidating a duty that was previously unliquidated." Restatement of Contracts, sec. 443.
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in which the existence and extent of the duty are issues7
that in fact were or ought to have been finally determined."1
It will be noted that under this section the judgment is to have
the effect stated whether it is in favor of the plaintiff or of the
defendant. The distinction is further developed in the following
comment to this section.
"Though many cases of discharge by previous adjudication also illustrate discharge by merger, the principles are
distinct, and in some cases only one of them is applicable.
In merger by judgment a later and more important basis
of legal duty replaces an earlier and less important one.
Discharge by adjudication on the other hand is based on
the policy of preventing unnecessary litigation between
the same parties regarding the same subject matter. If a
judgment were always compensation for such breaches of
duty as have actually occurred, the rule of merger would
completely cover the matter. But this supposition is not
true, in some cases the rule of discharge by adjudication
where it is applicable, by prohibiting further litigation, discharges pre-existing duties for which the prior judgment
gave no compensation.'"s
"The greater breadth of the rule stated in the Section
than that governing merger by judgment
is shown by
the fact that a right may be discharged by adjudication
where the judgment is in favor of the defendant in a case
where he is in fact subject to a duty. This may happen from
the inability of the party having the right to establish its
existence owing to a failure to secure evidence or to some
other cause."9
Merger by judgment is considered to a limited extent in the
iRestatement of Conflict of Laws. Following the section on the
effect of a foreign judgment there is a comment entitled "Merger"
and another entitled "Res judicata in action in personam." In the
former it is said.
"If the judgment was rendered in favor of the party
who .s now plaintiff at the forum, no action can be maintamed upon the original cause of action, if by the law of the
state where the former judgment was rendered such cause
of action has been merged therein. Thus, whether the effect
of the former judgment is to merge the plaintiff's cause
of action is determined by the law of the state where the
judgment was rendered."' 0
7

Restatement of Contracts, sec. 449.
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 449, comment a.
sRestatement of Contracts, see. 449, comment b.
2ORestatement of Conflict of Laws, sec. 450, comment f.
5
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In the second comment the same point appears to be dealt with
under the heading of res judicata
(I
if by the law of the state where a valid judgment
in favor of a plaintiff is rendered, the plaintiff is prohibited
from maintaining a subsequent suit upon a part of the
original cause of action upon which the judgment is renother states will give a similar effect to the
dered,
judgment.""'
Merger appears next in the Restatement of Restitution
"A cause of action for restitution against another is
terminated by its merger in a valid judgment against the
the facts establishihg the cause of action
other, based upon
12
for restitution.'

The nature of merger is explained in the comment to this section
the duty to return a benefit, its value or proceeds,
based upon the operative facts which led to the judgment, is
ended and a new duty is created based solely upon the
rendering of a judgment which is the crystalliiation and
specific definition of the preceding duty This rule results
from the desirability of not having two distinct claims
against one person, based upon the same operative facts,
existing simultaneously "13

This language would indicate that merger is but a phase of res
judicata. There is, however, a separate section on res judicata
which reads
"A cause of action for restitution against another is
terminated by a valid judgment on the merits in favor of
7114
the other.
This suggests a different basis for the distinction between
merger and res judicata than was offered in the previous Restatements. Merger applies to judgments for the plaintiff, res judicata
to those for the defendant. Both result in the denial of a second
action to the plaintiff on the same cause of action.
Merger is next considered by the Restatement of Torts
"
a cause of action by one person against another
for a tort is terminated by its merger in a valid judgment
against the other based upon a part of that cause of

action."' 5
"Restatement of Conflict of Laws, sec. 450, comment g.
"2Restatement of Restitution, sec. 145.
"3Restatement
of Restitution, sec. 145, comment a.
14 Restatement of Restitution, sec. 146.
"5Restatement of Torts, sec. 897. Comment b. to this section states that
the rule given by the section is "an application of the general principle that
where a person who has a claim against another obtains a judgment based
upon the operative facts creating it, the original claim ceases to exist and in
its place is a claim based upon the judgment."
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The suggestion, implicit in this section, that merger does not
apply when the judgment is upon the whole of the cause of action
obviously was not intended. The section evidently was drawn with
the question in mind which occurs when a plaintiff brings a second
action on a new state of facts, which are, nevertheless, but part
of the cause of action, as judicially defined, which was asserted in
the first action. In the language of the courts, the plaintiff cannot thus split his cause of action. The section above states this in
terms of merger. Comments to the section state the conditions
which determine whether a single cause of action is or is not
involved.
The same Restatement defines the doctrine of res judicata as
follows.
"A cause of action against another for a tort is terminated by a -valid judgment on the merits in favor of the
other in an action brought for such tort."' 8
This section appears to be confined to judgments in favor of
the defendant, yet the following comment to the section seems to
regard it as involving a principle applicable to judgments for the
plaintiff as well:"The principle by which a person is denied a second
opportunity to litigate the existence of a cause of action
between himself and another which has once been decided
in a- judicial proceeding terminating in a final judgment
has application to the law of torts."'7The latest Restatement which deals with the subject is that of
Judgments. Naturally this deals more fully with the subject than
any of the preceding Restatements. But the latter had set the
pattern, and the pattern was adhered to. It would be unrealistic to
expect the Institute to abandon a position which it had so completely and persistently followed. Three sections present the framework which is developed in detail by supporting comment. These
sections read:
"Where a valid and final personal judgment is rendered
in an action to recover money, the judgment is conclusive
between the parties, except on direct attack, to the following extent:
(i) if the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the cause
of action is extinguished and a-new cause of action on the
judgment is created,
16Restatement of Torts, sec. 898.
3.7 Restatement of Torts, sec. 898, comment a.
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(b) if the judgment is in favor of the defendant and is
on the merits, the cause of action is extinguished."'I"
"The rules stated in § 45 are applicable to judgments
in actions other than for the recovery of money, except that
where the judgment is given for the plaintiff there is no
merger of the cause of action in the judgment."",
"Where a valid and final personal judgment in an action
for the recovery of money is rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
(a) the plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action
against the defendant on the cause of action, but
(b) 0 the plaintiff can maintain an action upon the judgm ent.,o"

The supporting comments develop the application of these
sections in terms of merger or non-merger. It will be observed
that this Restatement introduces a distinction which had not been
made in the earlier Restatements, namely, that merger applies only
when the judgment for the plaintiff is for the recovery of money
The origin of this distinction will appear from later discussion.
The Restatement of Judgments appears also to attempt no distinction between merger and res judicata. The principles which
both include are stated under the single general heading "Former
Adjudication" and both are sometimes included within a single
section. 2 ' Evidently merger was being considered only in terms
of the right of the successful plaintiff to bring another action on
the same cause of action.
All of the Restatements thus accept to the full the doctrine of
merger by judgment as an active and usable principle in the law
They vary only as to the scope of its application and as to its relation to res judicata.
Even a casual perusal of standard texts and encyclopedias will
disclose that this acceptance of merger finds ample support in
judicial decisions. Judicial definitions of the doctrine tend to take
on a stereotyped form which goes back to the opinion of Lord Coke
in Higgeass Case.2 2 In this case an action of debt was brought by
18 Restatement of Judgments, sec. 45. Subdivision (c) deals with what is
commonly called estoppel by verdict, namely the effect of an adjudication of
a particular issue.
The comment to clause (a) states "Where a valid and final judgment for the payment of money is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the

claim is merged in the judgment. This means that the claim, whether valid
or not, is extinguished and a new claim on the judgment is substituted for it."
"Restatement of Judgments, sec. 46.

2°Restatement of Judgments, sec. 47

18.

2See Restatement of Judgments, sec. 45, quoted in the text at footnote
22(1606)

6 Co. Rep. 44 b., 77 Eng. Repr. 320.
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an executor and executrix upon a bond executed by the defendant
to the plaintiffs' testator. As a defense the defendant pleaded that
during his life the testator had brought an action on the bond
and had recovered. To this defense the plaintiffs interposed a
demurrer and argued that the plaintiffs had an election to sue
either upon the prior judgment or upon the bond. The argument
was rejected and among the reasons given by Lord Coke were the
followmg"But it was resolved, that as long as the judgment remans in force, he cannot have a new action upon the same
bond, for as he who has a debt by simple contract, and takes
a bond for the same debt, or any part of it, the contract is
determined.
So when a man has a debt on a bond, and
by ordinary course of law has judgment thereon, the contract by specialty which is- of an inferior nature, is by
judgment of law changed into a matter of record, which
is of a higher nature. 2. If he who recovers may have a
new action and a new judgment he may have infinite actions,
and infinite judgments to the perpetual vexation and charge
of the defendant & infinitum in jure reprobalur 3. On
every judgment the defendant shall be amerced, and if he

be a duke, marquis, earl, viscount or baron, he shall be
amerced to one hundred shillings, and so the defendant
might be infinitely amerced on one and the same obligation,
which would be mischievous, & interest repiblicae ut fit,
fillf' liftion."

The reasons given by the court did not rest on merger alone.
Arguments favoring an end to litigation were added typical of
those associated with the principles of res judicata, namely, that
it is unjust to the defendant and against the interests of the state
to permit continued litigation. The right to bring a second action
was the specific question involved, and in such cases it is common
for the courts to give both the argument of merger and that of
res judicata in support of their decisions.
Lord Coke's argument on merger rested on classifying the
obligation created by the judgment as of a higher order than the
cause of action on which it was based. It then invoked the analogy
of sealed instruments which also were regarded as of a higher
order than, and hence merged, the obligations which they superseded when these were not under seal.23 Classification of this
2
3"Owing to the peculiar sanctity attached to the use 6f the seal, and
owing to the unusual character of the written instrument as a species of evidence, the specialty has always been considered as of a higher nature than
the simple contract. Consequently where one delivers an obligation for a
simple debt already owing, the latter is merged in the former and ceases
to be a separate ground of action.' 2 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability
9, citing Brooke Abr., tit. Contract, pl. 29 (29 Hen. VIII.).
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character was typical of the early common law There were
higher and lower forms of action. 24 There were the higher courts
of the king as contrasted with the inferior or lower courts such
as the county courts or the foreign courts. 25 Classifying the judgment of a court as of a higher nature was, therefore, but characteristic of the mode of legal analysis of the day The analogy to
the sealed instrument seemed complete. It was the more easily
resorted to since it produced the desired result of denying a
second action to the plaintiff. The analogy is, of course, only
a superficial one. A sealed instrument supersedes the simple contract for which it is given because this will usually accord with
the intention of the parties. 26 If the intention was otherwise, as
where the sealed instrument was given merely as collateral security,
there was no merger even at common law 27 Merger by judgment,
24

Walton v. Hoath, (1313-1314) 6 & 7 Edw. II., 29 Seldon Soc. 79;
Year Books, (1345) 19 Edw. III., Pike's Ed., p. 66, No. 25. (writ of
escheat of higher nature than assize of novel disseism). All the courts appear
to have meant in cases such as these is that some actions, those of a higher
nature, were more inclusive of the issues adjudicated than others. Thus,' in
this sense, we might speak of ejectment as being of a higher nature than the
action of forcible entry and detainer. This was not clearly perceived by
Lord Coke in Ferrer's Case, (1598) 6 Co. Rep. 7 a., 77 Eng. Rep. 263, in
which he says "If the demandant be barred in a real action by judgment on
a verdict, demurrer, confession, etc. yet he may have an action of an higher
nature, and try the same right again, because it concerns his freehold and
inheritance." That the question turned on whether the same cause of action
or issues were involved was pointed out in Outram v. Morewood, (1803)
3 East
25 346, 355, 102 Eng. Repr. 630.
For this reason, the English royal courts refused to consider that
there was a merger when judgment was rendered by an inferior court. See
Higgens's Case, (1606) 6 Co. Rep. 44 b., 77 Eng. Repr. 320. This view was
applied also to foreign courts so that a foreign judgment did not bar a second
suit in England on the original cause of action. For authorities and criticisms
see Piggott, Foreign Judgments (2nd ed. 1884) 27, et seq., Read, Recognitioii
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1938) 111, et seq., Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1938) 549. The same position has been taken by some
courts in this country with respect to judgments of foreign countries. Swift v.
David, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 828, Eastern Townships Bank
v. Beebe, (1880) 53 Vt. 177, 38 Am. Rep. 665. Under the full faith and
credit clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV., sec. 1, the judgments of one state have
equal status with those of other states. The original ground for permitting
a second suit in another state on the original cause of action is, therefore,
no longer present. 2 Black, Judgments (2nd ed. 1902) sec. 864, 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) sec. 1394. That there may be, however,
other and constitutionally valid grounds for permitting the suit where the
judgment is an equitable decree other than for the payment of money only,
see footnote
41.
26
"When a bond or sealed nstrument is taken for a simple contract
debt, the former is of a higher nature than the latter, and the simple contract is merged, lost, and discharged by the bond.
The presumption is,
that such was intended by the parties where a security of a higher nature
is received, and that, too, whether it be the bond of the debtor or a third
person." McNaughten v. Partridge, (1842) 11 Ohio 223, 38 Am. Dec. 731.
27See Higgens's Case, (1606)- 6 Co. Rep. 44 b., 77 Eng. Repr. 320;
Drake v. Mitchell, (1803) 3 East 251, 102 Eng. Repr. 594.
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on the other hand, does not depend on, or purport to give effect
to, the intention of either party but often operates to defeat it.
The legal approach which thus characterized the early common
law has, of course, long disappeared. Nevertheless, courts " and
writers 2 9 as well as the Restatements, have continued to repeat
the formula that a judgment merges the cause of action because
it-is of a lugher nature.

An examination of the authorities discloses that the doctrine
of merger by judgment has been used as an argument to buttress
decisions reached primarily in three classes of cases. These include,
first, the right of a successful plaintiff to bring another action on
the same cause of action, second, the effect of a judgment in an
action upon a prior judgment; and, third, the effect of a judgment
against less than all of several joint obligors. As later discussion
will indicate, these are not the only instances in which the doctrine
has been relied upon, but they include the majority of cases which
deal with the subject. In each instance the decisions which the
application of merger by judgment supposedly produces have for
their underlying justification reasons quite independent of the
doctrine. The doctrine could be eliminated completely from our
law with no other consequence than clarification of the reasons
upon which the decisions invoking it actually rested.
Cases are legion in which merger is used as the justification
for denying the plaintiff the right to bring a second suit on the
original cause of action after having once recovered judgment upon
it. This was the question before the court in Higgens's Case. It
was the question with which the Restatements were primarily, if
not wholly, concerned. The argument is that, since the cause of
action is merged in the prior judgment, it is gone and there is
nothing left on which the plaintiff can sue. But the doctrine contributes little in these cases. It is not necessary to engage in such,
conceptualistic reasoning to deny the second action to the plaintiff. and it is not in reality the controlling consideration in such
cases. What controls is the importance of preventing multiplicity of
suits with the attendant expense to and oppression of the defendant
and unnecessary labor for the courts. That these reasons are commonly added to the statement of merger 0 indicates pretty well
that, of itself, the doctrine means little. If further demonstration
28

For a recent example, see Moore v. Justices of funicipal Court of
City of Boston, (1935) 291 Mass.-504, 197 N. E. 487, discussed and quoted
in text
29 at footnote 76.
See 6 Williston,-Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) secs. 1875, 1875E.
3
oSee text at footnote 76.
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is needed it appears in the cases which hold that the plaintiff
cannot split his cause of action and obtain judgment for a part only
and then sue again for the balance. In the large majority of these
cases not a word is said about merger and the decisions are put
strictly upon the necessity of avoiding excessive and unnecessary
litigation." That the doctrine logically applies in such cases cannot
be doubted. The whole cause of action is merged in such cases
2
although only a part of it was asserted by the plaintiff.
The use of merger as a justification for denying the right of
the plaintiff to bring a second action on the same claim originated
in the common law courts. Denial of the right to bring a second
legal action is well settled. When the similar effect of an equity
decree is considered, one runs into a quagmire of confusion and
conflict. To this the doctrine of merger has contributed no small
part. Some of the difficulty has been occasioned by differences in
views as to the nature and effect of an equity decree. Thus, the
right to sue again on the original cause of action is affected by
views held as to the right to bring an action upon the decree itself.
Interwoven with these considerations have been conflict of laws
concepts and constitutional law principles relating to the effect
of foreign judgments. As if these alone did not render solution of
the problem sufficiently difficult, the doctrine of merger has been
thrown in with its usual effect of thoroughly obscuring the issues
presented.
In order to observe the operation of the doctrine in equity cases,
somewhat detailed discussion of the effect of equity decrees, particularly in depriving the plaintiff of the right to sue again on the
original cause of action, seems unavoidable, notwithstanding the
valuable contributions already made by others in this field. In
extenuation, it may be said that the influence of the doctrine of
-For illustrative cases see Secor v. Sturgis, (1858) 16 N. Y. 548,
Williams-Abbott Electric Co. v. Model Electric Co., ((1907) 134 Ia. 665,
112 N. W 181, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 529; King v. Chicago, M. & St. P
Ry. Co., (1900) 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W 1113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81 Am. St.
Rep. 238, Pakas v. Hollingshead, (1906) 184 N. Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40, 3 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1042, 111 Am. St. Rep. 601, 6 Ann. Cas. 60. Thus, in the
King case, supra, the plaintiff recovered judgment for injuries to his person.
In the second action he sought to recover damages for injury to property.

In Minnesota, the use of the doctrine is practically non-existent. Brief
reference to it was made in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meester,
(1927) 173 Minn. 18, 22, 216 N. W 329.
32Merger is sometimes relied on in cases of this kind. See Hellstern v.
Hellstern, (1938) 279 N. Y. 327, 18 N. E. (2d) 296 (first action to establish
a trust in certain funds-second action for conversion of same funds denied),
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, (1943) 64 S. Ct. 208. The section of
the Restatement of Torts dealing with merger applies particularly to such
cases. See text at footnote 15.
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merger in these cases appears to have been only partially considdred. With the Restatement of Judgments resorting to the
doctrine in stating its solutions to the problems involved, such
influence may assume even greater proportions than it has in
the past.
That there is no merger when an equitable decree is rendered
upon a cause of action has been stated-in the following terms :3
"Indeed, it may be stated broadly that a decree in
chancery has not in itself (i.e. independently of what
may be done under it) any legal operation whatever. If a
debt, whether by simple contract or by specialty, be sued
for in a court of law, and judgment recovered, the original
debt is merged in the judgment, and extinguished by it,
and the judgment creates a new debt of a higher nature,
and of which the judgment is conclusive evidence. But if
the same debt be sued for in the court of chancery (as it
frequently may be) and a decree obtained for its payment,
not one of the effects before stated is produced by the
decree. Undoubtedly it has often been said by chancellors
that their decrees are equal to judgments at law, but that
only means that they will, to the extent of their power,
secure for their decrees the same advantages that judgments have at law; it does not mean that a decree is by
law equal*to a judgment."
In so far as the equity court was concerned it would not permit
another suit on the original cause of action. To have allowed it
would have been counter to the well known policy of the court
against multiplicity of suits.3 4 The equity court Awas not, however,
concerned with the use of conceptualistic arguments such as merger
to strengthen its position. Its justification was simply that the defendant should not be put to unnecessary expense and trouble by
more than one law suit when the whole matter could be included
5
in one.
The author of the quotation above contends, however, that so
far as the law courts are concerned they would grant the plaintiff
33
Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading (2nd ed. 1883) see. 43, p. 37,
note 4.
34
Story, Equity Pleading, sec. 287
35
In Purefoy v. Purefoy, (1681) 1 Vern. 28, the bill was for an accounting by a trustee of two separate estates. The plaintiff asked, leave to drop
one of them. This was denied, the court saying, "it is allowed as a good
cause of demurrer m this court, that a bill is brought for part of a matter
only, which is proper for one entire account, because the plaintiff shall not
split causes and make a multiplicity of suits."
With the same judges and courts now commonly administering both
legal and equitable relief, there is a tendency in modern cases to speak
m terms of merger when considering the effect of a judgment in an equitable action. See text at footnotes 36, 40.
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the right to bring a legal action on the original cause of action notwithstanding the equity decree, because the decree was only a
direction to the defendant, of a personal nature, to perform his
duty The legal right on which it was founded continued in
existence.
Today, this view is probably not accepted to the extent of its
full implications anywhere. Extensive .changes have taken place
in England, in most states and in the federal system so that the
same court and judge now generally administer both legal and
equitable relief. As a result this concept of the effect of an equitable
decree is rapidly disappearing. Courts refuse to regard their judgments in equity proceedings as have a fundamentally different
character than those which they render when acting in matters
characterized as legal.
When the decree is for the recovery of money only it is well
settled that a legal action cannot thereafter be brought on the original
cause of action. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Newton 0 the plaintiff
recovered a deficiency judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage. The present action was on the bond accompanying the
mortgage. Counsel for the plaintiff took the position that there
was no merger of the original cause of action because an equity
decree is not a judgment. The argument was rejected, the court
saying
"The doctrine of res adjudicata is plain and intelligible,
and amounts simply to this, that a cause of action once
finally determined without appeal, between the parties, on
the merits, by a competent tribunal, cannot afterwards be
litigated by a new proceeding, either by the same or any
And this is true, whether the first adother tribunal.
If the decree
judication is in a court of law or equity
is final, then its result is to merge the original cause of
action."
It will be noted that the court extends the concept of merger
to an equitable decree. This is a frequent tendency in this country
and is, itself, an illustration that the nature of judgments in equitable actions is not regarded as different from that of judgments in
legal actions. The underlying ground of the decision of the case is,
however, res judicata which it identifies with merger.
In Harrington v. Harrington37 the plaintiff had recovered a
decree in Rhode Island in an equitable proceeding to establish a
trust. The decree provided in part for the payment to the plaintiff
36(1888) 50 N. J. L. 571, 14 Atl. 756.
37(1891) 154 Mass. 517, 28 N. E. 903.
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of some moneys collected by the defendant as rents and profits
from the real estate involved. In the present suit, brought in
Massachusetts, the plaintiff sought to obtain judgment for the
same money in an action for money had and received. The equity
decree was-held a bar, the court stating"Whether
the court in that State was 'a court of
law or equity, or admiralty or of probate,' the matter in the
controversy and the parties being the same in this suit as
in that, the judgment of that court is conclusive, and is a
bar to the present action."
The result reached was the same as that reached in the Newton
Case but without invoking the doctrine of merger.
Both of these cases involved money decrees. Can a second
action be brought on the original cause of action when the decree
rendered upon it is for the performance of some act other than the
payment of money? Necessarily the second action would usually
also be an equitable one. The Restatement of Judgments makes a
distinction in such cases, stated in terms of merger,3-8 and would
permit the second acthon. There is no merger if the decree does not
require the payment of money only. The contention is that this is
so because an action cannot be maintained on the decree. In developing this point the Restatement says.
"Since the original cause of action is not merged in a
decree in favor of the plaintiff which is not a decree for the
payment of money, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded by
the doctrine of res judicata from maintaining an action at law
or a suit in equity upon the original cause of action. .
If
the decree has not been performed, the plaintiff can maintain a suit in another State on his original claim, since otherwise he "could not obtain a remedy there, because he could
not enforce-the decree in another suit and could not maintam an action on the decree. Where he brings an action in
the same State on his original claim, he will not be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata, but the court may
dismiss the action on the ground that it is unnecessary to
permit the plaintiff to maintain such an action and that it
would be a hardship to the defendant
to subject him unnec39
essarily to a second action."
These views raise a number of points involved in the general
problem and, since the quotation affords an illustration of the confusion that merger can introduce, a closer examination of it
may be justified. The first sentence assumes that some kind of
3
BRestatement of Judgments, sec. 45, quoted earlier in the text at footnote 18.
3ORestatement of Judgments, sec. 46, comment a.
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phenomenon takes place which is referred to as merger. Whether
it takes place depends upon the right to maintain an action on the
decree. If merger is not present, the doctrine of res judicata does
not apply The Restatement was considering whether another
action can be brought on the original cause of action after a decree
has been rendered upon it. The quotation evidences no recognition
of the fact that on that question res judicata and merger are one
and the same thing. Res judicata states more directly what the
court is in fact doing, namely, denying the second action. Merger
is merely a mental process indulged in to justify the denial in
conceptualistic terms. It describes or refers to no factual event
to which one can look to ascertain its presence. The first sentence
of the quotation might as well read
"Since the plaintiff is not barred from bringing another
action on the original cause of action by a decree in his favor
which is not a decree for the payment of money, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded by the doctrine of res judicata
from maintaining an action at law or a suit in equity upon
the original cause of action."
Simply put. A plaintiff, who may sue again, may sue again.
Whether the state of authorities is such that the distinction
made by the Restatement of Judgments can be said to represent a
majority view is open to question. That the plaintiff may sue again
on the original cause of action when the prior decree is not for
the payment of money is directly contrary to Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co. v. Grayson.40 In this case, a stockholders' stit was
brought in Alabama to cancel a lease executed by their corporation
to another, for an accounting for the use of the property tinder
the lease, and to enjoin the issuance of certain stock in connection with the transaction. Pending this suit, a second action was
commenced in Tennessee also seeking cancellation of the lease and
an accounting. Judgment for the plaintiff was rendered in the
latter suit and this was then asserted as a bar in the Alabama
action. The defense was sustained.
"The gravamen of the bill in each case, was the existence
of the void leases of the M. & C. Company to the E. T.,
V & G. Company, possession and use by the latter of the
former's property under these leases, and the indebtedness of
the lessee to the lessor on account of such possession and
use. The Tennessee decree determined each and all of these
matters. It cancels the leases, it enforces a surrender of the
property, and it settles the accounts between the parties.
40(1889) 88 Ala. 572, 7 So. 122, 16 Am. St. Rep. 69.
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After that decree, there was no lease in existence to be
upheld or annulled by our court; no property of one party
in the wrongful possession and enjoyment of the other, to
be restored to its rightful control and use, nothing due
from the E. T., V. & G. Company to the M. & C. Company,
to be decreed to be paid by the former to the latter. Complainant's cause of action had been destroyed by being
merged into the decree of a competent court, and there
was nothing left for the Chancery Court of Madison to
act upon."
Cases taking the opposite v'iev have not been discovered.
Whatever the correct rule, nothing is gained by stating it in terms
of merger or non-merger. To do so only obscures the nature of the
problem involved and the factors determining its solution.
The quotation under consideration from the Restatement
of Judgments makes it evident that the principal concern of
its authors was over the necessity of providing the plaintiff with
a remedy in a foreign state. Since they regarded the right to bring
an action on the decree, when not for money, as non-existent, the
only alternative was to allow suit on the original cause of action.
This problem is present only in the foreign state, for in the state
in which the decree was rendered the decree itself can be enforced
directly without a further action upon it. It should follow that
the right to bring the action on the original cause of action should
be confined to the foreign state. However, the doctrine of merger
gives but a single answer applicable to both situations. A cause
of action is either extinguished or it is not. It cannot be merged
for one purpose and not for another. The quotation from the Restatement follows this reasoning through to its logical conclusion.
In both states, the foreign and the domestic, the plaintiff "will not
be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata" from bringing another
action on the original cause of action. Evidently, for the domestic
state this appeared undesirable for the Restatement adds that the
courts will not permit the plaintiff to sue again because it is not
necessary and is a hardship to the defendant. This appears to be
nothing more than ajplying the principles of res judicata and
withholding the name.
It may well be that the plaintiff should, in some cases at least,
be, permitted to- sue in a foreign state on the original cause of
action when it is something, more than a .simple money decree. It
does not follow that he should be able to do so in the state where
the decree is rendered. The answer might properly turn on the
practicability and effectiveness of proceeding by action in the
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foreign state on the decree. Decrees requiring acts or forbearance
not involving the payment of money have no fixed form and often
are drawn with conditions in mind as they prevail in the'state in
which the decrees are rendered. Such a decree might not prove
suitable for enforcement in a foreign state. If so, the plaintiff
might well be permitted, though not necessarily required, to sue
again in the foreign state on the original cause of action. 4 These
are considerations independent of the doctrine of merger, which
has nothing to contribute to the solution of the problem.
Open also to question is the position of the Restatement that
an action can be brought upon a judgment only if it is for the payment of money The effect is to exclude equitable decrees calling
for other kinds of acts. An examination of the decisions suggests
that the Restatement in this respect has not kept pace with judicial
developments to date.
At common law the right to sue upon a judgment was recognized in the action of debt which, except for its earliest stages,
was an action for the recovery of money due to the plaintiff. The
common law rules were stated by Blackstone as follows.42

"So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against
another for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution
thereon, he may afterwards bring an action of debt upon
this judgment, and shall not be put upon the proof of the
4"This would not be inconsistent with the full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution and its implementing, statute. U. S. Const., Art.
IV, sec. 1, U. S. Code, Title 28, sec. 687 Full recognition of the decree
would be given notwithstanding suit was allowed in the foreign state on the
original cause of action. The decree would be conclusive of every issue decided or which might have been decided in the first suit. The only purpose
of the second action on the original cause of action would be to bring about
a more complete realization of plaintiff's rights adjudicated in the first
action by adapting the second decree to conditions existing in the foreign
state. Resort to the original cause of action would be only for this purpose.
This is consistent with Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, (1943) 64 S. Ct.
208. In this case a Texas award of workmen's compensation was held to
bar proceedings for a further award in Louisiana, since in Texas, pursuant
to its statute, the award was given this effect. There is broad language in
the opinion to the effect that the purpose of the full faith and credit clause
is "to establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the
common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where
the judgment was rendered, so that a cause of action merged in a judgment
In one state is likewise merged in every other." This must be read in the
light of the problem which the court was considering. There is nothing
in the opinion that denies the possibility of giving different effect in a
foreign state to a judgment or decree when necessary to complete realization
of the rights established. That the court.was considering only money judgments appears from the statement, "We are aware of no such exception o the
case of a money judgment rendered m a civil suit." (Italics supplied.)
423

Blackstone, Commentaries, 160.
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original cause of action, but upon-shewing the judgment
once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the
law immediately implies, that by the original contract of
_society the defendant bath contracted a debt, and is bound
to pay it. This method seems to have been invented, when
real actions were more in use than at present, and damages
were permitted to be recovered thereon, in order to have
the benefit of a writ of captas to take the defendant's body.
in execution for those damages, which process was allowable
in an action of debt (in consequence of the statute ,25 Edw.
III., ch. 17.) but not in an action real. Wherefore, since
the disuse of those real actions, actions of debt upon judgment in personal suits have been pretty much discountenanced by the courts, as being generally vexatious and
oppressive, by harrassing the defendant with the costs of
two actions instead of one."
There -were probably other reasons than those assigned by
Blackstone for allowing the action. It has been said that the action
was allowed to enable the plaintiff to recover interest on the judgment since execution on the judgment at common law was only
for the principal sum.43 The more substantial reason probably was
that a writ of execution was not available after a year and a day
had elapsed from the entry of the.judgment. Revivor of the judgment by writ of scire facias was confined to real actions until the
writ was extended by the statute of Westminster II.4 Hence, in
.the-remaining actions, the only means of enforcing a judgment
after a year and a day was by bringing an action of debt upon it
and obtaining another- judgment. When the statute removed this
reason by extending the writ of scire facias to all actions, it did
not take away the, right to bring the action of debt and it continued to be allowed.
Expressions of concern over the dangers implicit in allowing
multiple judgments, similar to that of Blackstone, may be found 5
and in some states the right to bring an action on a judgment so
long as the judgment can be enforced directly has been denied.'0
Thus, in Lee v. Giles47 the court said.
"The whole matter depends on the question, whether a
judgment is operative for a year and a day at common law;
' 3Clark v. Goodwin, (1817) 14 Mass. 237, Carter v. Colman (1851)
34 N. C. (12 Ired.) 274, Stevens v. Stone, (1901) 94 Tex. 415, 60 S. W
959, 86 Am. St. Rep. 861.
4413 Edw. I Stat 1, ch. 45.
45
Biddleson v. Whitel, (1764) 1 Win. Black. 506, 3 Burr. 1545.
46Lee v. Giles, (1830) 1 Bail. L. (S.C.) 449, 21 Am. Dec. 476; Pitzer
v. Russel, (1871) 4 Or. 124.
-7(1830) 1 Bail. L. (S.C.) 449, 21 Am. Dec. 476.
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for if it is, why within that time have any other remedy?
No sensible reason can be given why there should be,
whilst it cannot escape observation, that it would be uselessly oppressive if there were. I can never sanction the
idea that a new action should be permitted, by way of punishing the debtor for not paying his debt. There is something
barbarous in it, and wholly inconsistent with the mild,
benignant, and just spirit of the common law As long as
the judgment is operative, the creditor has the means of
enforcing payment, and if the debtor can pay, an execution
is as effectual as another suit, and more expeditious."
There is considerable justification for believing that the early
common law held the logical position that during the year and a
day, the action of debt was not available since the judgment could
be enforced by execution. 48 Most courts, however, have permitted
the action on the judgment notwithstanding execution is available
and ignore the possible danger that the defendant will be harassed
by a multiplicity of suits. 49 The stock answer to the objections
raised against this position is that the defendant can avoid all
hardship by paying the obligation."0 Evidently the consequences of
this holding have not always been satisfactory for, in numerous
states, statutes have been enacted restricting the right to bring the
action thus authorized. 51
With the rise of the equity court, the effect of its decree as
creating a cause of action ine'itably came up for decision. The
48
See discussion of the early common law authorities in Lee v. Giles
(1830)
1 Bail. L. (S.C.) 449, 21 Am. Dec. 476.
49
Merchants' National Bank v. Gaslin, (1889) 41 Minn. 552, 43 N. W
483, Davis v. Foley, (1916) 60 Oki. 87, 159 P 646, L. R. A. 1917A 187, and
note, 2 Black, Judgments (2d ed. 1902) sec. 958, Restatement of Judgments, sec. 47 (b), quoted in text at footnote 20.
5OAmes v. Hoy, (1858) 12 Cal. 11, Simpson v. Cochran, (1867) 23
Iowa5 81.
IThe New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 484 provides
"Except in a case where it is otherwise specially prescribed in this
act, an action upon a judgment for a sum of money, rendered in a court
of record of the state, cannot be maintained between the original parties
to the judgment, unless, either
1. Ten years have elapsed since the docketing of such judgment, or,
2. It was rendered against the defendant by default for want of an
appearance or pleading and the summons was served upon him otherwise
than personally; or
3. The court in which the action is brought has previously made an
order granting leave to bring it. Notice of the application for such an
order must be given to the adverse party, or the person proposed to be
made the adverse party, personally, unless it satisfactorily appears to the
court that personal notice cannot be given with due diligence, in which case
notice may be given in such manner as the court directs."
See also 2 Mason Minn. Stat., 1927, sec. 9476, 2 Minn. Stat., 1941,
sec. 549.08 (costs denied if brought without leave of court) , 2 Black, Judgments (2d ed. 1902), sec. 958.
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question has been completely settled, however, only with respect
to money decrees. While the early view of the common law courts
may have been otherwise, the modern tendency, as has already
been noted, is to recognize no distinction between the character of
judgments in legal actions and those in equitable suits. Hence,
it is generally held that a legal action such as debt may be brought
upon an equitable decree for money only.52 The action is sustained
on the ground that such a decree has the same qualities, dignity
and finality as has a judgment at law and should receive the
same recogmtion. There can be no doubt that the analogy is complete. Some respectable courts, however, .deem a second suit unnecessary for the protection of the plaintiff's rights, consider it
a hardship on the defendant and have refused to extend the rule,
applied to common law judgments, to equitable decrees. This
appears to be the English view5 3 and an occasional court in this
country has taken the same stand.5 4 Where a legal action is brought
on a foreign money decree, all courts agree that the action is a
proper one.55
On the question whether an equitablc action may be brought
on a money decree the decisions are in conflict. In Weidman v.
Weidman 6 the right to bring a bill in equity in Massachusetts on a
'New York alimony decree was denied on the ground that since
a legal action was available an adequate remedy was available and
52Dubols v. Dubois, (1826) 6 Cow. (N.Y.) 494, and see cases collected
in Note, 11 Ann. Cas. 658, 659.
53In Carpenter v. Thornton, (1819)

3 Barn. & Aid. 52, 106 Eng.

Repr. 582, the right to an action on a decree of the chancery court of

England was denied on the broad ground that a decree did-not create a
legal obligaton. In Henley v. Soper, (1828)

8 Barb. & Cr. 16, 108 Eng.

Repr. 949, a legal action on a decree of a foreign court was recognized,
the court stating, "There is a great difference between the decree of a
colomal court and of a court of equity in this country. The colonial court
cannot enforce its decrees here, a court of equity in this country may; and,
therefore, in the latter case there is no occasion for the interference of a
court of law, in the former there is, to prevent a failure of justice."
54
Boyle v. Schindel, (1879) 52 Md. 1, 7, Allen v. Allen, (1868) 100
Mass. 373; McKim v. Odom, (1835)

12 Me. 94, 104. See Pennington v.

Gibson, (1853) 16 Wheat. (U.S.) 64, 79, 14 L. Ed. 847, Warren v.
McCarthy, (1860) 25 Ill. 95.
55
Henley v. Soper, (1828) 8 Barn. & Cr. 16, 108 Eng. Repr. 949;
Pennington v. Gibson, (1853) 16 Wheat. (U.S.) 64, 14 L. Ed. 847, Post
v. Neafie, (1805)

3 Caine (N.Y.) 22; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.

1925), sec. 1066.
56(1931) 274 Mass. -118, 174 N. E. 206, 76 A. -L. R. 1359. In
White v. White, (1919) 233 Mass. 39, 123 N. E. 389, a lower Massachusetts court rendered an equitable decree on a foreign decree for alimony.
Contempt proceedings were held proper for the enforcement of the fassachusetts decree.
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equitable intervention was unnecessary 57 The contrary and more
realistic view was taken by the Minnesota court in Ostrander v.
Ostrander51 The plaintiff in this case had obtained a South Dakota
decree for the payment of permanent alimony The present action
in Minnesota was brought "not to recover that amount as a debt
by ordinary judgment and execution, but to compel its payment
through whatever power our courts may have, on the equity side,
to resort to sequestration, receivership, or even contempt proceedings, against defendant." The relief granted by the court was explicitly framed to give to the plaintiff all the remedies available for the
enforcement of domestic decrees of alimony This was sustained
for reasons which were stated by the court as follows
"Because of the nature of defendant's obligation and its.
origin, the enforcement of his duty is as much in need of
attention by sovereign power as though he had remained
in South Dakota. Transplantation of the parties from one
state to another has not reduced the obligation to the ordiMigration of the
nary category of a 'debt of record.'
parties across a state line has wrought no change in the
nature and basis of the obligation. Its purpose remains the
payment of alimony needed for the support of a former wife
and the child of herself and her debtor. To the ordinary
mind, untroubled by legal nuances, the money due from defendant remains alimony wherever they or either may be.
We prefer that nontechnical view whichi regards the substance of the matter as unchanged by mere removal of the
debtor across a state line.
"The decree ordered below is distinctly one ordering
the payment of alimony to a divorced wife. It is just as
much a need here of society and justice that such alimony
be paid as it was in South Dakota, when the original decree
was entered. Defendant's duty to plaintiff was fixed originally by the South Dakota decree. In neither ethical nor
legal quality would his obligation be otherwise had it been
imposed by a Minnesota judgment. The only difference is
that such a judgment would be directly enforceable against
him without the preliminary process of another for its
enforcement. The present action is of the latter nature.
Its purpose is to get a local judgment, not strictly for the
enforcement here of the South Dakota judgment, but that,
because of that decree, the duty shall be binding upon
defendant here as well as in South Dakota. The mandate
57Accord. Davis v. Headley, (1871) 22 N. J. Eq. 115, Bennett v. Ben-

nett, (1901) 63 N. J. Eq. 306, 49 At. 501, Mayer v. Mayer, (1908) 154
Mich. 386, 117 N. W 890, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 245, 129 Am. St. Rep. 477
58(1934) 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W 449.
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enforced locally will be that of our own court. Only in
that secondary sense does the court of another state, by its
own process, enforce the judgment of another state."
There is substantial disagreement where the decree is for the
performance of some act other than the payment of money, but
the trend is to allow the action on the decree. The leading case
usually referred to in this connection is Burnley v. Stevenson.
In this case a.Kentucky court had rendered a decree directing the
conveyance of certain Ohio lands to the plaintiff. The defendants
m that action then brought the present action in Ohio to recover
possession of the lands from the successors of the former plaintiffs.
The latter set up the decree as a defense and this Awas sustained. In
the course of its reasoning the court said.
"This decree was in personam, and bound the consciences of those against whom it was rendered. In it, the
contract of their ancestor to make the conveyance was
merged. The fact that the title which had descended to
them was held by them in trust for Evans [the plaintiff in
the original suit], was thus established by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction. Such decree is record evidence of that fact, and also of the fact that it (had) become
and was 'their duty to convey the legal title to him. The
performance of that duty might have been enforced against
them in that court by attachment as for contempt; and the
fact that the conveyance was not made in pursuance of the
order, does not affect the validity of the decree in so far as
it determined the equitable rights of the parties in the land
in controversy."
After referring to the full faith and credit clause of the United
States constitution, the court continued.
"That this decree had the effect in Kentucky of determining the equities of the parties to the land in this state,
we .have already shown, hence, the courts of this state
must accord to it the same effect. True, the courts of this
state can not enforce the performance of that decree, by
compelling the conveyance through its process of attachment; but when pleaded in our courts as a cause of action,
or as a ground of defense, it must be regarded as conclusive of all the rights and equities which were adjudicated
and settled therein, unless it be impeached for fraud."
While the foreign decree was asserted only as a defense, the
point is dearly made by the court that it could also serve as a
basis of a cause of action. This was. permitted in Mfallett v.
59(1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621.
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Scheerer"0 in which plaintiff had obtained an Illinois decree for
alimony "to be satisfied by the defendant by conveying to the
complamtant" certain real estate in Wisconsin. The defendant,
instead, conveyed the land to the present defendants. The present
action was brought in Wisconsin to set aside the deed and obtain
a decree directing the husband to convey the real estate to the
plaintiff in conformity with the Illinois decree. Relief was granted
because "the plaintiff is entitled to the relief in the courts of this
state of enforcing the Illinois decree by the judgment of our
courts." The decision in Ostrander v. Ostrander0 ' indicates that
similar views will prevail in this state.
The contrary view is based largely on the conception of the
nature of an equitable decree already discussed. 02 In Bullock v.
Bullock63 this was expressed as follows
"The contention that such an order requiring lands in
New Jersey to be charged with alimony created a personal
obligation on respondent is, in my judgment, without force.
It is a misuse of terms to call the burden thereby imposed
on respondent a personal obligation. At the most, the decree
and order imposed a duty on him, which duty he owed to
the court making them. That court can enforce the duty by
its process, but our courts cannot be required to issue such
process or to make our decrees operate as process."
The court also referred to the long-standing view that the
courts of one state could not affect or determine rights in land
located in another and felt that to allow the action "would result
in practically depriving a state of that exclusive control over immovable property therein which has always been accorded."
It is this view that has been adopted by the Restatement of
Judgments.
60(1916) 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W 182. See also Matson v. Matson,
(1919) 186 Ia. 607, 173 N. W 127, Rowe v. Blake, (1893) 99 Cal. 167,
33 Pac. 864, 37 Am. St. Rep. 45. Numerous writers favor this view. See
Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, (1919) 17
Mich. L. Rev. 527, Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause
to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, (1925) 34 Yale
L. Jr. 591, Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree, (1920)
5 Ia. L. Bull. 230; Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over
Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of
the State, (1930) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 494, Bentley, Equity Decrees in Sister
States, (1934) 8 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.
1938) sec. 214.
61(1934)

190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W 449.

62See text at footnote 33 et seq.

63(1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676, 27 L. R. A. 213, 46 Am. St.
Rep. 528. See also Fall v. Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L.
Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853, Pound, Progress of
Equity, (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 423.
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Most of the-cases dealing with the right to bring another action
upon a decree have involved decrees of a foreign state. Influenced,
probably, by the doctrine of merger, courts generally have not
made the distinction suggested by decisions in England and in
some states in this country between domestic and foreign decrees.6
Yet, it would seem that the problem is inherently different m the
two classes of cases. There is ordinarily little reason for permitting
-another action on the decree in the state in which it was rendered
since the decree itself can be enforced there.65 This ground for
denying the action is absent when the action is brought in a foreign
state. If the terms of the decree are .such that enforcement in the
foreign state is feasible and practicable, and it does not conflict
with judicial policies such as that, possibly, which leaves the determination of rights in land to the state in which it is located, the
plaintiff's right to sue on the decree should, be recognized.
The second class of cases dealing with merger concerns those
in which an action is brought upon a prior judgment or decree
and a second judgment or decree is recovered. Assuming that
such an action may be brought, the question is raised -whether
there is a merger in the second judgment so that the prior judgment is no longer in existence. Since the doctrine is based on the
premise that merger takes place only when an obligation of a
higher order supersedes one which is lower, the logical answer
should be that the prior judgment remains in existence. Confining
discussion for the moment to the case where the second action is in
the same state-as that in which the first judgment was rendered
three views appear to be held. Some courts, and probably the
majority, adhere to the logic of the doctrine. Merger cannot take
place when a judgment is rendered upon a judgment for the cause
of action is of equal dignity with the judgment rendered upon it.
The prior judgment therefore remains in existence.
Various results follow In Millard v. W'Vhitaker" the plaintiff,
who had already recovered a judgment on the original judgment,
was permitted to bring yet another action on the same judgment
and recover still a third. "The second judgment was of no higher
nature than the first, and there was consequently no extinguishment." That judgments can thus be multiplied in geometric proportions did not appear to disturb the court.
64See text at footnotes 52-54.
6sBut compare Rowe v. Blake, (1893) 99 Cal. 167, 33 Pac. 864, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 45, in which another action in the same state was allowed on a decree directing the sale of some real estate to enforce a lien on it. The court
felt no distinction should be made between money and other judgments.
6O(1843) 5 Hill (N. Y.) 408.
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Because there is no merger, the defendant is not entitled to an
entry of satisfaction of the first judgment merely because a later
judgment has been obtained on it."7 Execution may be levied tinder
the first judgment notwithstanding the existence of the second
since it has not been extinguished."" But there is a limit. Courts
have not overlooked the obvious fact that the various judgments
which have been permitted, in substance represent but a single
claim and hence, irrespective of how many judgments the plaintiff
may have, anything which constitutes satisfaction of one of then
will be held a satisfaction of the others also.08
0
the plaintiff held a judgment which, tinder
In Springsv Pharr"
the laws of the state constituted a lien on the debtor's homestead.
He brought an action on it and obtained a second judgment. Preceding this, however, but subsequent to the rendition of the plaintiff's original judgment, a third party had also obtained a judgment
against the debtor This was not a lien on the homestead. The
debtor died leaving insufficient assets to pay both claims. The
representative of the estate sold the homestead and the question
was presented whether the plaintiff was entitled to priority of
payment over the third party or whether he had lost his preferred
status under his original judgment by obtaining a second judgment upon it. It was held that the priority continued because
cc
a judgment upon a judgment, being of the same
dignity, does not fall within the general rule that a cause of
acton is merged in the judgment. Here, by virtue of the Act
of 1885, the justice's judgment, when docketed, remained a

lien on the homestead after the lapse of ten years, but would
lose its validity as to any other property after ten years
and could not be sued on after seven years. Is there any
67Mumford v. Stocker, (1823) 1 Cow. (N.Y.) 178, Griswold v. Hill,
2 Paine 492, 11 Fed. Cas. 63, No. 5836.
OsPreston v. Perton, (1600) Cro. Eliz. 827, 78 Eng. Repr. 1043,
Andrews
v. Smith, (1832) 9 Wend. (N.Y.) 53.
69See Carter v. Colman, (1851) 34 N. C. (12 Ired.) 274, McLean v.
McLean, (1884) 90 N. C. 530; Millard v. Whitaker, (1843) 5 Hill (N.Y.)
408, Doty v. Russel, (1830) 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 129. In Harvey v. Wood,
(1830) 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 221, the recovery of costs substantially increased
the amount of the second judgment. On levy of execution under the second,
an amount was obtained sufficient to cover the first judgment but not the
second. In the present action to revive the original judgment, relief was
denied, the court saying, "The law makes the application of the money received by the plaintiffs to the original judgment, which thereby becomes
extinguished. The proceedings of the plaintiffs are oppressive by thus tinnecessarily accumulating costs. The effect of the argument urged upon us by
the plaintiffs would be to keep alive two judgments, which might be ijurious to liens obtained by other creditors subsequent to the first and prior
to the second judgment."
70(1902) 131 N. C. 191, 42 S.E. 590, 92 Am. St. Rep. 775.
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reason why the judgment creditor can only keep it alive
-and enforcible as to subsequently acquired property outside of the homestead by paying as a penalty the surrender
on the homeof the priority of lien which he holds
stead under -the first judgment? We know of none, and
there is no precedent in this State to that effect."
It is evident that the court was actuated primarily by the undesirability of the practical consequences of the contrary holding.
The application of the doctrine of merger produced the desired
result.
The problems with which the courts were dealing in these
instances are essentially unrelated to each other. The right to
bnng multiple suits on a judgment is one question. A wholly
different question is presented in considering whether priorities
are ldst by obtaining a second judgment. Still another problem is
involved in determining whether execution should be permitted on
the original judgment. Independent consideration ought therefore
to be givei to each of these questions. That a plaintiff may or
may not bring more than one action on a judgment should have no
bearing on whether priority rights survive as against an intervening judgment. The answer to the latter question should not determine whether execution is available. Yet the doctrine of merger
lumps all of these issues together and gives but a single answer.
The second view, adopted on this question by some courts,
takes a position contrary to the preceding authorities and holds that
a judgment for the plaintiff in an action upon a prior judgment
does result in a merger. The leading authority for this view is
Gould v. Hayden.--' The plaintiff had obtained a judgment in
Indiana which was a lien upon the debtor's real estate located
there. He commenced an action in Ohio upon this judgment and
recovered another judgment there. In the meantime, the judgment
debtor conveyed his real estate in Indiana to a third party who
brought the present suit to enjoin enforcement of the Indiana
judgment against the real estate. Relief was allowed. The court
reasoned
"The judgment plaintiff, of course, controls his judgment. He may enforce its collection by the process of the
court in which he obtained his judgment, or he may, if he
7'(1878) 63 Ind. 443. The second suit was in a foreign state but the decision is clearly applicable also where the second suit is in the same state.
Accord.

Denegre v. Haun, (1862)

13 Ia. 240; Bertram v. Waterman,

(1865) 18 Ia. 529; McDonald v. Culhane, (1940) 303 111. App. 101, 24 N. E.
(2d) 737 (lien of intervening judgment of third party held to prevail over

second judgment of plaintiff).
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may elect so to do, use his judgment as an original cause
of action, and bring suit thereon in the same or some other
court of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute such suit to
final judgment. This procedure he may pursue as often as
he elects, using the judgment last obtained as a cause of
action on which to obtain the next succeeding judgment,
but the very freedom with which this may be done, ad
infinituin-and we know of no law or legal principle which
would prevent its unending repetition-is, to our minds, a
convincing and conclusive reason why each successive personal judgment ought to and must be regarded as a complete merger and extinguishment of the preceding judgment,
with all its qualities and incidents.
If the precedent
judgment is merged, as we think it must be, in the succeeding judgment, then it follows of necessity, as it seems to us,
that the former judgment is completely extinguished. It
has ceased to exist for any purpose, it can not be used again
as the foundation of another action, and all its qualities
and incidents are lost and swallowed up in the judgment
obtained thereon."
Fear of the abuses, which complete freedom to bring repeated
actions on a judgment might produce, was what led the court to its
decision. The doctrine of merger was resorted to as a means of
penalizing the plaintiff and thus deterring him from further actions
on the judgment. To extend the penalty to instances where the
plaintiff sought to enforce his rights under the judgment in a
72
foreign state in open to question.
Still a third view regards merger as logically taking place when
a judgment is based on a prior judgment, but holds that there are
exceptions to its application in cases where it would produce hardship and injustice. Typical is Lawton v. Perry.13 In this case, after
the plaintiff secured judgment on the original cause of action, the
debtor died. The judgment was a lien upon the debtor's real estate.
The plaintiff, instead of presenting the judgment as a preferred
claim against the estate of the deceased, brought an action against
the administrator of the estate and secured another judgment. This
raised the question whether he had lost his preferred status and
hence was compelled to share the assets of the estate in common
with other general creditors. It was held that this was not the
result. While the court recognized that "so far as dignity or rank
as between the judgments
they were the equal one of the
other, for each was a judgment," and that "no new dignity was
created," yet it took the position that "usually it happens that the
72See text at footnote 64, et seq.
73(1893) 40 S. C. 255, 18 S. E. 861.
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cause of actton is so completely absorbed in the judgment that it is
not competent longer to consider such cause of action apart from
the judgment." But the case before the court was considered as
presenting an exception on the ground that the general rule, if
applied, would result in hardship.
"Would it not be hardship to declare tits judgment of
Perry, trustee, obtained in 1889, to have destroyed that of
1867? It seems to us that it should fall among the exceptions to the general rule, and not affecting the general rule."
In Gilchrist v. Cotton 74 the plaintiff had recovered a judgment
for alimony. She brought an action upon this and recovered another judgment. Subsequently the defendant was adjudged a bankrupt and after the usual proceedings received his discharge. Under
the bankruptcy act a judgment for alimony is excepted from the
effect of such a discharge. In determining the status of the plaintiff's claim in proceedings for the administration of the estate of
the defendant after his death, the court held that the second judgment was still for alimony and was not barred by the discharge
in bankruptcy. The court recognized the Indiana rule on merger
as asserted in Gould v. Hayden" but asserted that "where justice
requires it, a judgment will be adjudged to be an old debt in a new
form, and will not be regarded as creating a new debt." Of course,
the problem before the court was wholly unlike that involved in
Gould v. Hayden and, except for the doctrine of merger, no one
would have supposed that a decision in the latter case should have
any bearing on the question being considered by the court.
The three views just discussed consider the doctrine of merger
as it relates to judgments in actions upon judgments -within the
same state. More commonly the point has arisen when the second
judgment is rendered in a foreign state. That there should be a
distinction is not often recognized. The problem is again approached from the fruitless inquiry whether there is or is not a
merger. A good-example of such decisions is Moore v. Justices
of Municipal Court.Th The plaintiff had obtained a judgment in a
Massachusetts court. He then brought an action in Maine upon
this judgment and recovered another judgment there. The present
.proceeding was a supplementary process based on the original.
judgment in Massachusetts. This was resisted on the ground that
the latter judgment had become merged in that rendered in ?laie.
74(1925) 83 Ind. App. 415, 148 N. E. 435.
7Z

(1878) 63 Ind. 443. See footnote 71.

76(1935) 291 Mlass. 504i 197 N. E. 487
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The court held that the supplementary process was proper because
there was no such merger.
"The underlying principle on which the doctrine of
merger rests is that a judgment is an obligation of higher
quality than the original cause of action as to defenses,
permanence and remedies for collection. The public welfare
and the interests of parties require that there be not a repetition of the trials of the same issues. The reasoning on which
the doctrine of merger rests is not applicable where an action on a judgment rendered in one State is brought in
another State and a second judgment is there recovered. No
9bligation of stronger attributes is thus created. Commonly,
there is no difference in the quality attaching to the judgments of courts of different States. They stand on the same
footing in essential particulars. One has no superiority over
the other, one is of as high a nature as another."
On like reasoning, it has been held that another action may be
brought on a judgment in the state in which it was rendered, notwithstanding that a judgment was recovered prior thereto in another state. 77 Similarly, the judgment rendered in the second state
does not bar an action on the original judgment in still a third
state.78 The existence of the judgment in the foreign state does not
bar proceedings in the state of the original judgment looking to
the enforcement of the judgment such as a creditor's bill to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance and to subject the property conveyed
7
to the satisfaction of the judgment. 1
There are very substantial reasons why the plaintiff should be
allowed to enforce his claim by judgments in several states. But
these reasons are not to be found in considerations of merger or
non-merger. When the assets of the defendant are distributed over
several states or in states other than that in which the original
judgment was rendered, it would seem but simple justice to permit
the plaintiff to use the procedures available in each state for realizing satisfaction of his claim without being penalized in the others.
One of the few decisions in which these considerations have been
given recognition states them in the following language 80
77Weeks v. Pearson, (1831) 5 N. H. 324.
7BLilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, (1912) 163 Cal. 632, 126 Pac. 483,
Ann. Cas. 1914A 364, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 360.
79Wells v. Schuster-Hax Nat. Bank, (1897) 23 Colo. 534, 48 Pac. 809.
See Bates v. Lyons, (1838) 7 Paige (N.Y.) 85. Gould v. Hayden, (1878)
63 Ind. 443, is contra to the cases cited in footnotes 76-79. The case is discussed
supra in another connection. See footnote 71.
8
OVan Winkle v. Owen, (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 253, 259, 34 Atl. 400.
In Wolford v. Scarbrough, (1929) 224 Mo. App. 137, 21 S. W (2d)
777, it was held that the allowance by a probate court of a judgment as a
claim against the estate was merely a means of collecting the judgment and
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"I am unable to see any reason in law or in public policy
'why, if A. recovers a judgment against B. in the State of
New York and acquires a lien by virtue of it upon property insufficient to pay it, and immediately afterwards brings a
suit on that judgment and recovers upon it in the State of
New Jersey, he must, as a condition of recovering that
judgment in New Jersey, lose his lien by virtue of his
judgment in New York and all remedy thereunder."
Again in Matter of Williais,8 ' in denying that a judgment
rendered on a foreign decree for alimony was discharged by
bankruptcy of the defendant, the court after holding that there was
no merger, said.
"It may be inconvenient that two judgments should subsist in the same state against the same person on the same
judgment, but no such inconvemence can exist in the case of
judgments rendered in different states, and there is no
sufficient reason for the application of the purely technical
doctrine of merger subversive of substantial justice as it
would be in such cases."
The reasons which justify permitting julgments to exist in
several states on the same claim are quite absent when actions are
brought upon judgments in the same state. Decisions permitting
the former should not be relevant, therefore, to cases involving the
latter. Likewise decisions denying the latter, should. not be held
to bar the former. The doctrine of merger, however, is entirely
blind to practical distinctions of this kind and gives but a single
answer in both classes of cases. 2
did not result m its merger. By way of analogy the court referred to cases
involving judgments of a foreign state and stateed, "courts will not go
beyond the reason of the rule to hold that a judgment is merged in a subsequent judgment thereon if there is any reason why the creditor needs more
than one judgment to collect his debt."
81(1913) 208 N. Y. 32, 101 N. E. 853, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 719.

s2Itwas the objections to local actions on judgments which led the
court in Gould v. Hayden, (1878) 63 Ind. 443, to hold that a foreign judgment on an Indiana judgment merged the latter so that an intervening conveyance-by the debtor of lands on which the Indiana judgment was a lien
took priority over it. See text at footnote 71.
In Anderson v. Anderson, (1942) 155 Kan. 69, 123 P (2d) 315, the
plaintiff recovered judgment in Kansas in a prior action for instalments due
under a Colorado decree for support money for the child of the parties.
The present suit was a new action in vhich the plaintiff sought to impress
the homestead of the defendant with a trust on the ground that moneys used
by the defendant to buy it should have been used to pay the support money.
After holding that grounds for a constructive trust were absent, the court
added the hastily considered argument that the plaintiff's cause of action
was merged m the Kansas judgment. In so far as the argument has aty
meaning, it could only be that the plaintiff should have asserted her
present claim in the first Kansas action and that she was attempting to split
her cause of action by her present suit contrary to the principles of res
judicata.
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The third class of cases in which the doctrine of merger has
been commonly invoked includes those in which judgment is taken
against less than all of the obligors to a joint obligation. A good
statement of the position of the courts is given in Brady v
Reynolds.!3 After holding that a joint obligation was involved,
the court continued
"The undertaking of the Harpers, and the defendant
being then regarded as joint, the principal question raised
upon the appeal is susceptible of a ready solution. The payee
sued the Harpers upon the guaranty, and recovered judgment. The entire contract was merged in that judgment.
The defendant was not made a party to the suit, and as he
was only liable jointly with the Harpers, the effect of the
judgment was to relieve him of all responsibility . There
is no rule better settled than that a judgment against one on
a joint contract of several, bars the action against 'the
others, even though the latter were dormant partners unknown to the plaintiff when the original action was
brought.8 4 When the contract is joint, and not joint and
several, the entire cause of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of the parties not sued with those
against whom the judgment has passed, being gone, their
entire liability is extinguished. They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no several obligation, they
83(1859) 13 Cal. 31. See also Note, 1 A. L. R. 1601. In Restatement of
Contracts, sec. 119 and Restatement of Judgments, sec. 101, the rules are
stated without putting them in terms of merger.
The question has most commonly been considered in connection with
judgments against one or more but less than all of several partners. See
Mason v. Eldred, (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 231, 18 L. Ed. 783, United States
v. Ames, (1878) 99 U. S. 35, 44, 25 L. Ed. 295, Fleming v. Ross, (1907)
225 I1. 149, 80 N. E. 92,*8 Ann. Cas. 314, 2 Williston, Contracts (rev.
ed. 1936) sec. 330; 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) see. 568,
In Davison v. Harmon, (1896) 65 Minn. 402, 67 N. W 1015, the
plaintiff 'had commenced the action against both of two joint obligors.
On failure of one of them-to answer, he entered a default judgment against
him. This was held to release the. other defendant because of the resulting
merger. The decision was prior to the statutes cited in footnote 91, which it
probably helped to bring about.
Highly technical and complex rules prevailed where the obligation was
joint and several. Thus, a judgment in a joint action against all barred
further action against any obligor individually. Likewise, judgment against
one obligor barred a joint action against all or the remainder. A judgment
against some but less than all barred either a joint or an individual action.
See Sessions v. Johnson, (1877) 95 U. S.347, 24 L. Ed. 596; Bangor Batik
v. Treat, (1829) 6 Me. 207, 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) 337,
Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) sec. 571. In Stearns v. Aguirre, (1856)
6 Cal. 176, a default judgment against one in an action against two joint
and several obligors was held to discharge the other obligor. Merger was
frequently invoked to justify these results. The comments in the text are
equally
applicable.
84
Citing Smith v. Black, (1822) 9 Seargt. & Rawle (Pa.) 142, Ward
v. Johnson (1816) 13 Mass. 148.
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cannot be sued jomtly with the others, because judgment
has been already rendered against the latter, who would
otherwise be subject to two suits for the same matter."
Standing alone, this would appear to give the doctrine of
merger substantial force on its own accord. But, considered with
other well settled rules governing joint obligations, it seems evident that merger played but a minor role in the development of
the principles stated. The common law sought to give effect to the
policy that a joint promise of several persons should be treated
as far as possible as the single obligation of all and the individual
obligation of none of them. Hence, all had to be included as parties
to the action. 5 A release of any released them all. 0 It was but a
corollary of this policy that any judgment on the obligation must
be against all of the obligors. To give separate judgments against
the different parties would be at variance with the singleness of
the obligation. "The liability being joint, the action and judgment
87
must be of the same nature.
The policy which prescribed this result was of independent and
early origin. Professor Williston believes that it was suggested
by the analogy to joint estates in real property and was first
applied to joint covenants. s8 But merger came in as a useful tool
for the development of the policy. Res judicata could hardly be
appealed to as a reason for denying an action against the remaining obligor for he had not been a party to the first action. It was
no hardship to him to be subjected to the suit. The doctrine of
merger, however, applied neatly to the situation. With the cause
of action merged in the first judgment, there was notlung left
with-which to sue the remaining obligor.
Controlling in these cases, then, is not any concept of merger
but-the insistence of the courts that a joint obligation be kept joint
-in the judgment rendered upon it. When it has been felt that the
policy ought not to be applied, merger has not been allowed to
stand in the way. In Crehan v. Megargels9 the joint obligors were
in different states so that it was not possible to sue then all in one
action. It was held that a judgment against those in one state did
not prevent an action against the others located in other states.
Note the following language.
-'This rule of merger of joint obligations is a technical
ssChitty, Pleading, 42.
so2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 333.
s7-Warren v. Ricldes (1924) 129 Wash. 443, 225 Pac. 422.
882 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 318.
89(1922) 234 N. Y. 67, 84, 136 N. E. 296.
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one inherited from the common law, which often has been
productive of injustice and which is enforced by courts
with more or less restlessness and repugnance. Whatever
the origin of the rule, it is qualified today by the principle
of election, it being held that where a creditor holding the
joint obligation of several parties proceeds to recover judgment against part of them it is evidence of a choice to thus
hold part and let the others go. Therefore, various exceptions have been engrafted upon the rule to the effect that
when the action of the creditor is controlled by circumnstances which negative any idea of an election he will be
exempted from the effects of the ,judgment as a merger."'
"Whatever course of reasoning may have been adopted
in various decisions, it is in accordance with this rule that it
has been held in many jurisdictions that where a creditor
bringing suit upon a joint obligation is unable to get service
upon some of the obligors because they are beyond the jurisdiction in which he is acting, his judgment there recovered
will not be regarded as a bar against the obligors not served,
when he is able to obtain jurisdiction of them in some other
forum."
Whatever the artificiality of some of the reasoning, the significance of it is that the doctrine of merger, which was so readily
invoked to support the general rule, was with like readiness discarded when the court felt that the underlying considerations required a different result.
Today, in many states, this problem is largely one of historical
interest only Statutes have been enacted abrogating the common
law rules stated above."1 With them goes the effect of merger in
these cases. It never had any force anyway Its main effect was
to obscure the real reasons for the consequences which it purported
to produce.
The three major classes of cases discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, namely, those dealing with the right to bring another
suit on the original cause of action, those considering the effect
of a judgment in an action upon another judgment, and those
involving judgments against less than all of several joint obligors,
are the principal cases in which the doctrine of merger has been
invoked. It is believed they justify the conclusion that the doctrine
has been of little or no value in offering any real solution to the
specific problems presented by them and that the real grounds of
"Citing U. S. Printing & Lith. Co. v. Powers, (1922) 233 N. Y 143,
134 N.
E. 225.
91For summary of these statutes see 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.
1936) sec. 336. See 2 Mason Minn. Stat., 1927, see. 9411, 2 Minn. Stat.,
1941, sec. 548.20.
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decision lie in considerations which the doctrine entirely ignores.
The doctrine is not, of course, confined to these instances.
Logically, it postulates all the consequences incident to the disappearance of the cause of action. But other instances in which
the doctrine is applied only confirm the conclusion already reached.
Thus, if an action is brought upon a cause of action which abates
upon the death of a party, there is no abatement if judgment is
recovered by the plaintiff before the death occurs. It ii said that
the cause of action is merged in the judgment, "which has all the
attributes of a judgment in actions ex conlractu."92 The latter, of
course, survive. All that is involved is the question whether the
policy of regarding a cause of action at an end ;vith the death of
either party, which prevails in certain classes of cases, applies
after judgment is rendered. The reasons for the answer will not be
found in the empty words of merger.
A debt upon which a judgment has been rendered has been
held not to be subject to garnishment in an action against the
judgment creditor in another state by a third partyY,3 This was put
upon the ground that the debt is merged in the judgment and so
is no longer in existence. The underlying reasons, however, are
practical ones. In the first place, relitigation of the debt should not
be permitted in the garnishment proceedings. The debtor's liability
has been fixed by the, judgment. Secondly, the foreign court is
not in a position to stay process upon the judgment pending the
disposition of the garnishment proceedings. To allow the judgment
would, therefore, expose the judgment debtor to the risk of double
liability, or at least difficulty and inconvenience in avoiding itY4
92Fowden v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co., (1906) 149 Cal. 151, 154, 86

Pac. 178, Abearn v. Goble, -(1932) 90 Colo. 173, 7 P (2d) 409; Carr v.
Rischer, (1890) 119 N. Y. 117, 124, 23 N. E. 296. See Vitale v. Duerbeck,
(1936) 338 Mo. 556, 571, 92 S. W (2d) 691, stating, "A judgment is a debt,
a property right which goes, upon the owner's death, to his personal representative regardless of what may have been the cause of action upon winch
it wvas obtained."
The case last cited illustrates some of the artificiality of reasoning to
which the doctrine of merger can lead when the court says: "When a judgment is affirmed by an appellate court, the cause of action which became
merged in it, when it is rendered, merely remains merged therein. When
a judgment is reversed, it ceases to exist, and the merger is terminated because there remains nothing in which the cause of action could be merged.
The reversal is really a determination that it wras never propertly merged
because of prejudicial error in rendition of the judgment, and therefore, it
reverts
93 to its original status of merely a cause of action."
Detroit F & Marine Ins. Co. v. Stewart, (1916) 123 Ark. 42. 184
S. W 438, Tourville v. WVabash R. R Co., (1899) 148 'Mo. 614, 50 S. W
300, 71 Am. St. Rep. 650, aff'd Wabash R. Co. v. Tourville, (1900) 179 U. S.
322, 21 S.Ct 113, 45 L. Ed. 210.
94For these reasons the judgment also is not subject to garnishment.
See Drake, Attachment (7th ed. 1891) sec. 625.
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Merger has been used in considering the effect of an assignment for collection which had been given by the holder of a claim."
The assignment included authority in the assignee to make a settlement. It was held that the authority did not extend to a judgment
obtained by the assignee on the claim. This was put partly on the
ground that the claim assigned came to an end by merger in the
judgment, but the real issue before the court was the determination
of the scope of the authority conferred by the assignment. Again,
a statute prescribing the mode of assignment of a cause of action
was held not to apply to an assignment of the judgment onl itbecause, in part, "all rights of the litigants are merged in the judgment and such judgment is assignable without" compliance with
the statute, but the real ground of decision was "that the statute
was intended to regulate assignments of causes of action after suit
and before judgment. ' 91 6 Merger has also been used in determining
the applicability of a statute of limitations." The rule followed in
the state in which the question arose was that the running of the
statutory period on actions on county *varrants was suspended by
absence of funds in the county treasury It was held that this rule
did not apply to a judgment on the warrants, because the cause
of action to which the rule applied was merged in the judgment. It
is evident that practical considerations might easily have weighed
with the court in favor of the decision rendered.
A case of more than passing interest is Willianmsburgh Sawngs
Bank v. Bernstem 8 in which the doctrine of merger was used to
justify the denial of the right to an action of interpleader. Money
had been deposited by a deceased party during his lifetime with tile
bank in trust for Y X, a third party claiming the money, commenced an action against the bank and Y to recover the account.
The bank disclaimed any interest in the controvery Y interposed
a counterclaim against the bank and obtained judgment. X, after
securing appointment as administrator of the estate of the deceased
depositor, then brought an action as such against the bank and Y
to recover the account for the estate. The present action by the
bank followed in which X and Y were interpleaded and in which
the bank obtained an order restraining Y from enforcing his
judgment pending the outcome of the action. On appeal it was
95Titus
v. Miller, (1942) 132 N. J. Eq.541, 29 A. (2d) 550.
9
6Pigford Grocery Co. v.Wilder, (1917) 116 Miss. 233, 76 So. 745.
97City df Harper, Kan., v.Daniels, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1914) 211 Fed. 57,
129 C. C. A. 242.
98(1938) 277 N. Y. 11, 12 N. E. (2d) 551.

MERGER BY JUDGMENT

held error to grant this order. Merger was one of the principal
reasons,
"The cause of action which [Y] had on her counterclaim
in the first above-mentioned action arose out of the contract
of the bank under which it agreed to pay the amount of the
deposit to the one entitled thereto.. That cause of action,
embracing the claim to the deposit, ripened into and was
merged in the judgment procured by her in that action.
No longer did the relation between [Y] and the bank rest
upon a contract engagement between the parties or their
privies, for the contract relation involving mutuality had
-ceased. A new and different obligation on the part of the
bank arose whereby the lav implied a promise on the part
of the bank to pay.
The right of [Y] to receive payment of an account as a depositor or.as a ceshu, qztc trust
had ceased. Her claim against the bank became that of a
judgment creditor. Such rights or obligations upon entry of
judgment became final."
After pointing out that for interpleader the conflicting claims
must be to the same thing, fund, debt, or duty'the court continued.
"It is here alleged that the adverse claims of defendants
are to the account and deposit. So far as [Y] is concerned
there is no account or deposit. The subject-matter of the
-action has disappeared.
It is not alleged, nor could it be
alleged and successfully established, that there are adverse
claims to the judgment as between the defendants."
The point before the court, which appears neither complex or
difficult of solution, is completely obscured by the argument based
on merger. The liability of the bank to Y had already been adjudicated. The principles of res judicata forbid permitting the
question to-be relitigated, by mterpleader or otherwise. Liability
to the estate being the only issue open to dispute, there was no basis
for interpleader. Merger only confused the problem. It does not
accord with the facts to say that the parties after Y's judgment
were not making claim to the same thing or fund. Both parties
were claiming the money deposited in the bank. The claim of Y is
still the same, the only difference is that the judgment established
its validity so that the bank no longer could question it and makes
available means for its enforcement.
The discussion thus far-illustrates how varied the problems are
which the doctrine of merger can be made to answer and how
devoid it is of pointing to the controlling factors which determine
their solution. When one turns to the cases in which the application of the doctrine is denied when logically called for, the attempt
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to find any content in it proves even more futile. A leading author
of a work on the subject states a well recognized qualification of
the doctrine in the following, frequently quoted language .1,
"The doctrine of merger is calculated to promote ustice
and will be carried no further than the ends of justice require. The judgment.does not annihilate the debt. The
essential nature of the cause of action remains the same.
The law of merger does not forbid all inquiry into the
nature the cause of action. If the prevailing party was
entitled to certain privileges, or exemption from certain
burdens, under his contract he may be entitled to the same
privileges and exemptions under his judgment. Whenever
justice requires it, the judgment will generally be construed
not as a new debt but as an old debt in a new form."
This principle is commonly applied to give to the judgment the
preferred status which the original cause of action had. Thus, if
the cause of action is not subject to discharge by bankruptcy of
the debtor, the judgment thereon is likewise not dischargedoo In
a leading United States Supreme Court decision, the court said
"The argument is that the judgment now existing
against Boynton is not the debt that existed at the time
bankruptcy proceedings were initiated, that by the change
of character of the debt from an ordinary claim or obligation to a judgment of a court of record it ceased to be the
same debt and became a new and different debt as of the date
of the judgment. 10 2

But this court, to which this precise

question is now presented for the first time. is clearly of
opinion that the debt on which this judgment was rendered
is the same debt that it was before, that, notwithstanding
the change in its form from that of a simple contract debt,
or unliquidated claim, or whatever its character may have
been, by merger into a judgment of a court of record, it still
992 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) sec. 550. Quoted with approval
in State v. Citizens State Bank, (1927) 115 Neb. 593, 214 N. W 6,'incorporated as part of the opinion in Gould v. Svendsgaard, (1919) 141
Minn. 437, 170 N. W 595, cited in Cobbey v. Peterson, (1931) 89 Colo.
350, 3 P (2d) 298.
19OBoynton v. Ball, (1887) 121 U. S. 457, 7 S. Ct. 981, 30 L. Ed.
985, Woehrle v. Canclim, (1910) 158 Cal. 107, 109 Pac. 888, stating, "It
certainly would be a somewhat absurd situation if the person having a claim
for such willful and malicious injuries who had procured a legal adjudication thereof occupied a worse position under the Bankrupt Act, than one who
had not procured such a judgment."
OlOBoynton
v. Ball, (1887) 121 U. S. 457, 7 S. Ct. 981, 30 L. Ed. 985.
02
Compare Restatement of Judgments, sec. 45, quoted in text at footnote 18. The section is reconciled with the principle discussed in the text in
the following manner- "Although by the judgment the original cause of
action is extinguished and a new cause of action is created, advantages to
which the plaintiff was entitled with respect to the original cause of action
may not be destroyed by the judgment," Restatement of Judgments, sec. 47,
comment d.
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remains the same debt on which the action was brought in
the state court and the existence of which was provable
in bankruptcy."
A preference given by state laws to premiums due for workmen's
compensation insurance is retained notwithstanding they have been
reduced to judgment.'0 3
There are other instances also in which merger has not been
permitted to impose a harsh and unjust result and which do not
involve the preferred status of a claim. Where judgment is rendered against a principal and his guarantor on a note and mortgage, which the guarantor pays, he is entitled to an assignment of
the note and mortgage and the principal debtor cannot successfully
contend that their assignment is impossible because they have
become merged in the judgment which was paid. 04 The right to
set off a claim against the assignee of a cause of action against
the defendant is not lost by obtaining judgment on the claim in an
independent action on it subsequent to plaintiff's assignment. The
argument that the claim was merged in the judgment and so cannot be used as a set off and that the judgnment came into existence
after -the assignment and so also cannot be used is untenable.10 5
When parties to an action settle the controversy and a judgment
for the amount agreed on is entered in favor of the plaintiff, the
lien of the plaintiff's attorney on the cause of action is not lost
by merger. 06 Judgment for an attorney's services does not so merge
the cause of action that he loses his lien on funds deposited in court
07
All of these cases were decided on
in the course of the action.Y
the ground that, in the interests of justice, merger, which called for
the contrary decision, will be ignored and the judgment construed
as a new form of the old debt.
State v. Citizens State Banki0 s bears out the same point and
makes interesting comparison with Willianlsburgh Savings Bank
2031n re Williams H. Deason & Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 19-7) 19 F (2d:
275.
l°4Cobbey v. Peterson, (1931) 89 Colo. 350, 3 P (2d) 298, stating, "I
would be a rare application of the principle invoked to say that the
guarantor of a note upon being required to pay a judgment given against
him thereon should thereby suffer the loss of his universally conceded right
to pursue the primary debtor." Accord. Sateed v. Abeyounis, (1940) 217
N. C.0 5644, 9 S. E. (2d) 399.
, Gould v. Svendsgaard, (1919) 141 Minn. 437, 170 N. V 595.
100 6Byram
v. Miner, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 47 F (2d) 112.
7
rAmeican Automobile Ins. Co. v. Niebuhr, (1938) 124 N. J. Eq. 372,
2 A. (2d) 46, stating, "The doctrine of merger arises out of the quality of
a judgment which renders it conclusive; to permit a second suit on the
original cause of action would be treating it as still open to controversy...
The doctrine of merger is not pushed to extremes."

l°st1927) 115 Neb. 593, 214 N. W 6.
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v. Bernstein. 10 9 A state law created a guaranty fund for the protection of depositors in banks within the state. A depositor coinmenced an action against a bank on his deposit and recovered
judgment. It was argued that by this he lost his status as a depositor and became merely a judgment creditor and hence not
within the protection of the guaranty fund. After pointing out the
"anomalous" and "farcical" situation which this would produce by
permitting unscrupulous bankers to defeat protection of the
guaranty fund by denying payment and forcing legal action, the
court refused to apply the doctrine of merger and held that the
depositor, notwithstanding the judgment, continued to remain so.
None of these decisions denying the application of the doctrine
can be questioned. What is open to question is the doctrine itself
which has to be repudiated in order to avoid results which are
unjust, anomalous and farcical. One may also legitimately ask what
becomes of a doctrine whose applicability must itself in each instance be tested by the desirability or justice of the results which
it produces. Is it not the elements which make up the desirability
or justice, rather than the doctrine, which determines the course
of the decisions? It is these that should be stated and made the
basis of the controlling principles of law which are enunciated,
and the doctrine of merger should be eliminated and forgotten.
Since the doctrine of merger by judgment is based on no
yeality, some of the decisions have produced opportunities for
interesting dialectical acrobatics. It has been held that a judgment
on a note secured by a mortgage extinguishes the note but the
debt remains in the form of the judgment and continues to be

secured by the mortgage. Hence a further action to foreclose the
mortgage is proper."10 Notwithstanding the general rule followed
in some states that an amendment of the complaint cannot introduce a new cause of action, the plaintiff may amend from a cause
of action on a note to one on a judgment on the note.'' Evidently
merger is nothing which inheres in a judgment for the parties
may agree that the judgment for the plaintiff shall not constitute
109(1938) 277 N. Y. 11, 12 N. E. (2d) 551. See text at footnote 98.

"10 Rossiter v. Merriman, (1909) 80 Kan. 739, 104 Pac. 858, 24 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1095.
1'Teberg v. Swenson, (1884) 32 Kan. 224, 4 Pac. 83. Contra. Green
v. Starr, (1880) 52 Vt. 426. See Schroll v. Noe, (1927) 297 S. W 999,
aff'd on certiorari in State v. Cox, (1929) 323 Mo. 520, 19 S. W (2d) 695,
holding that both may be alleged in the alternative. At common Mw both
the judgment and the cause of action on which it was based could be joined
by separate counts in one declaration. Downer v. Shaw, (1851) 23 N. H.
125.
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a merger.312- Another action will also be permitted on a portion of
a cause of action not included in the first action in cases where its
exclusion was induced by the fraud of the defendant." 3 It is not
necessary to vacate the judgment and restore the cause of action.
If the defendant fails to raise the proper objection, he may find
two judgments against him on the identical cause of action, 211 a
logical impossibility if merger had any meaning. Attempting to
give it meaning in this connection produced some extraordinary
judicial analysis in Price v. First Nat. Bank."5
Price had been indebted'to the defendant Bank on some notes
which were secured by a trust deed on certain real estate. These
notes were later renewed and as additional security a mortgage
was given on Price's homestead. The renewal notes not being
paid, the Bank brought two actions. The first was on all of the
notes and foreclosure of the mortgage on the homestead was asked
for. A personal judgment was secured together with a decree of
foreclosure of the mortgage. A foreclosure sale was had, the
homestead was purchased by the Bank and the usual deed was
executed to-it. In the second action, brought at the same time,
some but not all of the notes were sued upon, a personal judgment was sought and, in addition, foreclosure of the trust deed
was asked. After judgment was rendered in the first action, the
.second action was tried, judgment was rendered for the amount
of the notes included in this suit, foreclosure of the trust deed
was decreed and the property ordered sold. In the present action
Price sought to set aside the deed to the homestead executed in the
foreclosure proceedings under the judgment in the first action. He
was held entitled to the relief asked in consequence of the judg112Frick Co. v. Rubel Corporation, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d)
768, stating, "The first judgment might indeed have merged this cause of

action, except for the stipulation, for ordinarily a party may not split Ils
claim. However, there is no objection to an agreement that the first judg-

ment shall not be a merger, the purpose of the doctrine being only to avoid
the vexation of two suits when one will serve." Compare Woods v. Locke,
(1930) 3 49 Ida. 486, 289 Pac. 610.

" Vineseck v. Great Northern R. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 96, 161 N. W
494, 2 A. L. A. 530 and note; State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior
Court, (1927) 145 Wash. 576, 261 Pac. 110; White v. Adler, (1942) 289
N. Y. 34, 43 N. E. (2d) 798, 142 A. L. R. 898 and note. This view is
criticized in 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1975) sec. 554, as a collateral
attack on the judgment. This author's belief is that the proper remedy

should be by application in the first action to have the judgment set aside.
This is but an attempt to give substantive effect to the doctrine of merger
and requires a procedure much more cumbersome and indirect than that
resulting
4 from the prevailing view.
"11
Danels v. Runyons (1915) 164 Ky. 309, 175 S. W 358. See Doerr v.
Schmitt (1941) 375 Ill. 470, 31 N. E. 971.

3.5(1901) 62 Kan. 735, 64 Pac.-637, 84 Am. St. Rep. 419.
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ment rendered in the second action. The court reasoned
"While the several causes included in the first action
became merged in the judgment therein rendered, and
thereby extinguished, the debt still existed in that judgment, and the second judgment, being for the debt
included in the first judgment, is a total extinguishment of
that judgment. The judgment itself having been thus extinguished, there was nothing to support the order of sale,
and the sale conveyed no title."
The court's reasoning appears to be that the life and validity
of the first judgment depended on the cause of action which
had become merged into it. The second judgment extracted the
cause of action from this judgment and left it a lifeless form
incapable of sustaining the sale which it ordered. Why the merger
in the first judgment did not leave the second without its necessary prop is not explained. The primary factor prevailing upon
the court was the danger, which the court believed existed, of harm
to the defendant in having two judgments against him on a single
obligation.116 It failed to recognize that this situation is not uncommon11 and that the defendant could have avoided it by taking
proper objection to the pendency of the second action, or, after the
first judgment was rendered, pleading it as a bar to the second suit.
Finally, as if to underline the vacuity of the whole doctrine of
merger by judgment, it has been held that a judgment may become
merged in an obligation of a lower quality In News-Dispatch
Pruiting & Audit Co. v. Board of Com'rs"8 the plaintiff had obtained judgment against the defendant county The county issued
certain bonds to pay the judgment and issued also some warrants
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to receive the warrants intended for him. He thereupon brought mandamus to compel the
county to pay the judgment. Relief -was denied, for, says the court
"When the funding bonds were issued, plaintiff's judgWhen the
ment thereby became merged into the bonds.
funding bonds were issued and sold, and thereby became an
16"It is claimed by counsel for defendant in error that the judgment

debtors in this case were amply protected. We find nothing in either judgment that protects them. In the first action the defendant in error recovered
a judgment for $16,728.09 and costs. This was the total amount of the
Prices' indebtedness. In the second action it recovered another judgment
in the sum of $11,047.84 and costs. Both of these judgments were liens,
so far as the record is concerned, on the property of the defendants, and
were subject to enforcement. To say that the judgment debtor could have
gone into court and pleaded the satisfaction of one as the satisfaction of
both, is not a protection."
1171t exists whenever an action is allowed upon a judgment and it is
held that no merger results. See discussion supra, footnote 66 et seq.
118(1927) 130 Okla. 152, 266 Pac. 437
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outstanding obligation against the county, the judgment no
longer existed as an entity aside from the bonds. The facts
that plaintiff's judgment was not paid out of the proceeds
did not have the effect to revive the judgment which passed
out of existence, as such, upon the issuance of the bonds."
One might suppose that a concept so devoid of meaning, contributing so little to the development of the law and subject to
such numerous deficiencies would be headed for ultimate discard.
It is too much to expect. The doctrine of merger by judgment has
had, if not the understanding, at least the recognition of eminent
judges and writers. Courts have paid homage to it for centuries.
It now has been sanctified by the American Law Institute. Decisions and discussions in terms of merger will undoubtedly continue.
But, if the doctrine is to remain with us, it should not be too much
to expect of those that use it, that it be used with an understanding
of its limitations. It should not be permitted to obstruct from view
the real issues present for determination. Neglect of vital considerations which should control decisions should not be indulged by
succumbing to the enticing simplicity of solution which the doctrine
appears to offer. This much one should be entitled to ask. But, if
these precautions should be observed, we would very probably hear
no more of the doctrine.

